G2 x Vals Legal Research Bench: Overview and Methodology

No. Client cannot stop paying Lessor on these facts, and Lessor is not responsible for the defective refrigeration units. Client's remedy is against Manufacturer and its bankruptcy estate under the Manufacturer warranty, not by withholding rent from the finance lessor.

1. This is a non-consumer finance lease. Assuming the transaction is a true lease of goods, it fits Virginia's finance-lease definition. Lessor did not select, manufacture, or supply the Trailers; Client selected the model and negotiated specs with Manufacturer. Lessor acquired the Trailers in connection with the Lease. And, before Client signed, Lessor gave Client a complete copy of the Manufacturer purchase agreement, including the two-year mechanical/refrigeration warranty. That satisfies Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-103(1)(g)(i)–(iii)(A). It is not a consumer lease because Client is a corporation using the Trailers in its freight business. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-103(1)(e).

2. Client accepted the Trailers. Acceptance occurs after a reasonable opportunity to inspect when the lessee acts as if it will take or retain the goods, or fails to make an effective rejection. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-515(1). Client used and retained both Trailers for about four months before the compressor failures, so acceptance almost certainly occurred.

3. After acceptance, Client's rent promises became irrevocable and independent. In a non-consumer finance lease, "the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods," and those promises are enforceable and not subject to cancellation, termination, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the payee's consent. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-407(1)–(2). The Lease's "absolute and unconditional" no-setoff/no-recoupment language reinforces the same result. Thus, Manufacturer's breach, insolvency, or inability to honor warranty claims is not a defense to Client's monthly rent owed to Lessor.

Although Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-508(6) generally allows a lessee to deduct damages resulting from a default from unpaid rent, this right is explicitly prefaced as being "Subject to the provisions of § 8.2A-407." Because Client's promises are independent and irrevocable under § 8.2A-407, Client is statutorily and contractually barred from withholding rent, seeking a setoff, or asserting a counterclaim against Lessor to excuse its non-payment.

4. Revocation does not change the result on these facts. The compressor failures substantially impair the Trailers' value, but Article 2A sharply limits revocation in a finance lease. The usual revocation grounds based on an assumed cure or difficulty discovering the defect are excluded for finance leases, and the separate lessor-default revocation ground is excluded for non-consumer finance leases. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-517(1)–(2). There are no facts that Lessor made assurances inducing acceptance or that the Lease gives Client a special revocation right. So Client cannot use revocation to stop paying Lessor.

5. Lessor did not warrant the Trailers. An express warranty by a lessor requires the lessor's own affirmation, promise, description, sample, or model to become part of the bargain. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-210. Here the Lease contains no Lessor warranties and directs equipment claims to Manufacturer. Virginia Code § 8.2A-212(1) provides: "Except in a finance lease, a warranty that the goods will be merchantable is implied in a lease contract if the lessor is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Section 8.2A-213 carries the same "[e]xcept in a finance lease" exclusion for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Section 8.2A-216 expressly provides that lack of privity is no defense against "the manufacturer or lessor of goods, other than as lessor under a finance lease." Lessor made no warranties, all implied warranties against the lessor are excluded in a finance lease, and Client has no third-party-beneficiary warranty claim against Lessor.

6. Client's actual recourse. Virginia Code § 8.2A-209(1) makes Client a third-party beneficiary of Manufacturer's promises (including the express two-year warranty) to Lessor under the supply contract, to the extent of Client's leasehold interest, but only against Manufacturer, not against Lessor. The problem is that Manufacturer has filed Chapter 7 and the trustee will not honor outstanding warranty claims. Client's only recourse for the defective Trailers is a timely proof of claim in Manufacturer's bankruptcy for breach of the express warranty, as an unsecured creditor. Recovery will depend on the size of the bankruptcy estate and the priority of Client's claim, and will likely be minimal. The allocation of supplier-default risk to the finance lessee, while it keeps paying the lessor, is the deliberate (if harsh) design of the finance-lease structure.

Conclusion. Client should not withhold rent. Its nonpayment is a default, giving Lessor the remedies available for a lessee's failure to pay, including remedies under Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-523 and any Lease remedies. Client must continue paying Lessor and cannot set off or recoup the defective-Trailer losses against the rent.

Sources: Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.2A-103, 8.2A-209, 8.2A-210, 8.2A-212, 8.2A-213, 8.2A-216, 8.2A-407, 8.2A-508, 8.2A-515, 8.2A-517, 8.2A-523 (Code of Virginia, Title 8.2A).

Rubric check results

The answer passes all 14 rubric items (26 of 26 weighted points) and therefore passes all-pass.

No on both counts. Under Virginia's enactment of UCC Article 2A (Va. Code Title 8.2A), Client cannot lawfully stop paying Lessor, and Lessor is not responsible for the defective Trailers. The transaction is a "finance lease" that is not a consumer lease, so by statute Client's payment promises became "irrevocable and independent" upon its acceptance of the Trailers (Va. Code § 8.2A-407).

Each element of § 8.2A-103(1)(g) is satisfied here. Client picked out the model and negotiated the refrigeration specs with the Manufacturer; the Lessor did not select, manufacture, or supply the trailers. The Lessor bought the Trailers from the Manufacturer for $85,000 each in connection with the Lease. The Lessor gave Client a complete copy of its purchase agreement with Manufacturer before Client signed the Lease, exactly the disclosure required by § 8.2A-103(1)(g)(iii)(A). The Lease is not a "consumer lease" under § 8.2A-103(1)(e), which covers leases to individuals "primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose." Client is a corporation hauling refrigerated freight, a commercial user.

In a non-consumer finance lease, the lessee's promises become irrevocable and independent upon acceptance and are not subject to cancellation, termination, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the payee's consent. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-407(1)–(2). Virginia's lessee-remedies section also makes rent deductions "subject to" § 8.2A-407. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2A-508(6).

Client used the Trailers for four months before the compressor failures, plainly an acceptance. Acceptance also limits revocation: § 8.2A-517(1)(a), (1)(b), and (2) all expressly carve out finance leases, foreclosing the usual routes for a lessee to revoke acceptance based on the lessor's assurances, the difficulty of pre-acceptance discovery, or the lessor's default.

Va. Code § 8.2A-214 allows a lessor to disclaim implied warranties of merchantability and fitness in a writing that is conspicuous and uses language like "as is" or "with all faults," which the Lease's express disclaimer accomplishes. Section 8.2A-209 makes the Lessee (not the Lessor) the beneficiary of the Manufacturer's warranties: the warranty claim passes through to Client against the Manufacturer, not against the Lessor.

Client should not withhold rent. Its nonpayment is a default under § 8.2A-523. Client may pursue whatever warranty/bankruptcy claim it has against Manufacturer, but it must continue paying Lessor and cannot set off or recoup the defective-Trailer losses against the rent.

Rubric check results

The answer passes 11 of 14 rubric items (20 of 26 weighted points, 77% partial credit) and fails all-pass.

Full question

A husband originally from Mexico entered the United States on a B-2 visa on December 1, 2022. He was issued an I-94 that was valid until June 1, 2023. On December 20, 2022 he married his wife, who is a United States citizen. The husband and wife filed a “one-step” I-130 and I-485 case for the husband with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on January 1, 2023. The couple was issued a Request for Evidence (“RFE”) on the I-130 petition on July 5, 2023, but the couple never received it because USCIS mailed it to the incorrect address (an address which was never provided by the couple). The I-130 was denied due to lack of response to the RFE on December 5, 2023, and the I-485 was denied on January 15, 2024.

Until April 1, 2026, the couple assumed that the husband’s cases were still pending with USCIS. However, on that day the husband learns that he was ordered removed in absentia by an immigration court on August 1, 2025. USCIS appears to have mailed a Notice to Appear to the husband at the same faulty address used to mail his RFE.

Please explain if the husband has any recourse to contest the denial of his I-130 and I-485. Please also explain, as of April 1, 2026, what must be filed with the immigration court and what fees (if any) would be required.

Full reference answer

The couple can file a Motion to Reopen on Form I-290B with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). Under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2), USCIS may accept late motions to reopen where the delay was "reasonable” and beyond the applicant’s control. Notably, whether to accept the late-filed motion is within the discretion of USCIS.

USCIS using an address that was never provided by the applicant is a circumstance outside the applicant’s control. However, USCIS may question whether a delay of over 2 years from when the applicant’s I-130 and I-485 were denied was “reasonable.” Rather, it would be reasonable to expect an applicant to inquire into their pending immigration applications with USCIS on a somewhat regular basis. Therefore, the husband’s main hurdle in having the Motion to Reopen granted will be convincing USCIS that their discretion should be exercised, which includes convincing USCIS that the delay in filing the I-290B was reasonable.

However, given that the husband has an outstanding removal order at the immigration court and entered on a B-2 visa, he cannot adjust status before USCIS even if USCIS reopens his I-130 and I-485. The husband will instead need to proceed with a possible adjustment of status through marriage in the immigration court. However, because he has an outstanding removal order in the immigration court (meaning that his removal proceedings are complete), the husband will first need to file a Motion to Reopen at the immigration court to stay and hopefully rescind his in absentia removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iii); 8 CFR § 1003.23. Given that his Notice to Appear (NTA) was mailed to an incorrect address, the husband can argue that he did not receive notice of the initiation of his removal proceedings. For in absentia removal orders where the respondent to removal proceedings did not receive notice, there is no filing fee for the Motion to Reopen in immigration court as of April 1, 2026.

Rubric items

Each item is evaluated as pass or fail. Weights determine partial credit; every item must pass for all-pass.

1. Concludes that the couple can file a Motion to Reopen on Form I-290B with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). Weight: 3
2. Identifies that under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2), USCIS may accept late motions to reopen where the delay was "reasonable” and beyond the applicant’s control. Weight: 1
3. Identifies that whether to accept the late-filed motion is within the discretion of USCIS. Weight: 1
4. Identifies that USCIS using an address that was never provided by the applicant is a circumstance outside the applicant’s control. Weight: 2
5. Identifies that USCIS may question whether a delay of over 2 years from when the applicant’s I-130 and I-485 were denied was “reasonable.” Weight: 2
6. Identifies that the husband's main hurdle in having the Motion to Reopen granted will be convincing USCIS that their discretion should be exercised. Weight: 2
7. Identifies that convincing USCIS that the delay in filing the I-290B was reasonable is central to obtaining a grant of the Motion to Reopen. Weight: 2
8. Concludes that given that the husband has an outstanding removal order at the immigration court and entered on a B-2 visa, he cannot adjust status before USCIS even if USCIS reopens his I-130 and I-485. Weight: 3
9. Identifies that the husband must proceed with a possible adjustment of status through marriage in the immigration court. Weight: 2
10. Identifies that because he has an outstanding removal order in the immigration court, the husband will first need to file a Motion to Reopen at the immigration court to stay and rescind his in absentia removal order in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iii) and 8 CFR § 1003.23. Weight: 3
11. Concludes that because his Notice to Appear (NTA) was mailed to an incorrect address, the husband can argue that he did not receive notice of the initiation of his removal proceedings. Weight: 3
12. Identifies that for in absentia removal orders where the respondent to removal proceedings did not receive notice, there is no filing fee for the Motion to Reopen in immigration court as of April 1, 2026. Weight: 2

Full question

On July 12, 2025, a group of 200 individuals gathered to protest federal government immigration policies in a downtown Chicago plaza. The protest was generally peaceful, people were holding signs, chanting and occasionally stepped into the street, but mostly stayed on the sidewalk. There were a couple of verbal arguments with people passing by.

After a couple of hours, the Chicago Police issued a dispersal order over a loudspeaker declaring the protest an unlawful assembly. The police said they were concerned about traffic disruptions and the potential for escalation.

Several individuals remained, asserting their right to protest. 30 individuals were arrested for failure to disperse. Did the Chicago Police violate the First Amendment by ordering dispersal of a peaceful protest without clear evidence of unlawful conduct and arresting individuals for failure to disperse?

Full reference answer

The rights of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly for lawful purpose are rights protected by the First Amendment and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, (U.S. Const. amend. I; U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Public streets and sidewalks are considered traditional public forums where First Amendment protections are at their highest (Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)). Here, the protest occurred in the traditional public forum of a public plaza and sidewalk where participants had the right to assemble for their peaceful protest.

In public forums, the government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public demonstrations if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication (Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)). Here, the dispersal order was not narrowly tailored. The Chicago Police targeted more speech than was necessary when they used a total dispersal order for a protest that was largely peaceful, with no violence or property damage and only intermittent street interference. Traffic control and public safety are significant government interests, but the blanket dispersal order is in insufficient fit between the government interest and the restriction. Further, because the police did not tell protesters where they could go to continue their protest, they did not leave open ample alternative channels for communication.

In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that police may declare unlawful assembly and issue dispersal orders where there is clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or threat to public safety (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). Courts have held that police dispersal orders must be based on actual, not speculative threats and provide clear notice with the opportunity or comply (Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997)). In this case, the protest was largely peaceful and the justification for the dispersal order (general concern about escalation), appears to be speculative.

In Edwards v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court found that arrests made based on the underlying protected conduct of peaceful protests, was unconstitutional under the First Amendment (Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)). The Supreme Court has also held that one cannot be punished for failing to obey a command that violates the Constitution (Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963)). The arrests made for failure to disperse were made based on a dispersal order that was not a lawful time, place and matter restriction under the First Amendment, making them constitutionally invalid.

Since the First Amendment strongly protects peaceful protest activity in public forums, it is likely that the Chicago Police violated the First Amendment when they ordered dispersal without a clear, lawful basis. Police may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public demonstrations if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. While traffic control and public safety are significant government interests, a total dispersal order for a peaceful protest that does not direct protesters to a place to continue the protest was too broad and speculative to be constitutional. A dispersal should be based on evidence of imminent violence or unlawful conduct which was not present in this instance. Under Constitutional standards, the arrests made based solely on an unlawful order are invalid as well. Thus, Chicago police violated the First Amendment by ordering dispersal of a peaceful protest without clear evidence of unlawful conduct and arresting individuals for failure to disperse.

Rubric items

Each item is evaluated as pass or fail. Weights determine partial credit; every item must pass for all-pass.

1. Recognizes the rights of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly for lawful purpose are rights protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Weight: 1
2. Recognizes First Amendment rights are applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Weight: 1
3. Recognizes public streets and sidewalks are considered traditional public forums subject to First Amendment protections. Weight: 1
4. Identifies that the plaza for this protest as a protected forum. Weight: 1
5. Identifies that government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public demonstrations if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Weight: 2
6. Identifies that police can order dispersal of a protest where there is clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or threat to public safety. Weight: 1
7. Determines that a valid police dispersal order must be based on actual, not speculative threats and provide clear notice with the opportunity to comply. Weight: 1
8. Determines that while traffic control and public safety are significant government interests, a total dispersal order for a peaceful protest that does not direct protesters to a place to continue the protest was too broad and speculative to be constitutional. Weight: 2
9. Determines that arrests made based on the underlying protected conduct of peaceful protests are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Weight: 2
10. Concludes that Chicago police violated the First Amendment by ordering dispersal of a peaceful protest without clear evidence of unlawful conduct and arresting individuals for failure to disperse. Weight: 3

Full question

Client is a Virginia corporation ("Client") that hauls refrigerated freight out of Rockbridge County. In early 2024, Client needed two new reefer trailers and went to a national manufacturer ("Manufacturer") to pick out a model and negotiate the refrigeration specs. Client then arranged for a Virginia equipment financing company ("Lessor") to buy the trailers ("Trailers") from Manufacturer for $85,000 each and lease them to Client under a written 60-month lease ("Lease") at $2,200 per month per trailer, and Lessor gave Client a complete copy of its purchase agreement with Manufacturer, which included Manufacturer's standard two-year warranty on all mechanical and refrigeration components, before Client signed.

Four months after delivery, both Trailers had compressor failures that left the units unable to hold temperature, and Manufacturer agreed to fix them under the warranty but filed for Chapter 7 two months later, where the trustee confirmed it wouldn't honor outstanding warranty claims. That said, the Lease doesn't include any warranties from Lessor and tells Client to take equipment claims to Manufacturer. It also says that Client's payments are "absolute and unconditional, irrespective of any defense or any right of setoff, counterclaim, or recoupment." Client has stopped paying Lessor. Given these facts, can Client stop its payments to Lessor, and is Lessor responsible for the defective Trailers?

Full reference answer

Client can't stop paying Lessor, and Lessor isn't responsible for the defective Trailers, because the Lease is a "finance lease" under Va. Code § 8.2A-103(1)(g). Given that the Lease is a non-consumer finance lease, Client's payment obligations are "irrevocable and independent" upon acceptance of the Trailers under § 8.2A-407(1), §§ 8.2A-212 and 8.2A-213 exclude implied merchantability and fitness warranties in finance leases, and § 8.2A-209(1) routes Client's warranty recourse to Manufacturer through the supply contract. That's true even though Manufacturer filed for Chapter 7 because, in a finance lease, it's the lessee and not the lessor who bears the risk of the supplier going under.

The Lease qualifies as a "finance lease" under § 8.2A-103(1)(g) because Lessor didn't "select, manufacture, or supply" the Trailers (Client picked them out and negotiated the specs directly with Manufacturer's team), Lessor "acquire[d] the goods . . . in connection with the lease" (Lessor bought the Trailers from Manufacturer for $85,000 each at Client's request and leased them to Client), and Client "receive[d] a copy of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods . . . before signing the lease contract" (i.e. Lessor gave Client a complete copy of its purchase agreement with Manufacturer, including the two-year warranty, before Client signed). The Lease also isn't a consumer lease under § 8.2A-103(1)(e) because Client is a corporation, not "an individual" who took the Trailers "primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose," and that distinction is significant because § 8.2A-407 applies to a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, while § 8.2A-517(2) carves that same category out of one revocation remedy.

Given that the Lease is a non-consumer finance lease, § 8.2A-407(1) provides that "the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods," and § 8.2A-407(2)(b) provides that those promises are "not subject to cancellation, termination, modification, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the party to whom the promise runs." Client accepted the Trailers under § 8.2A-515(1) by taking delivery and using them for four months without rejecting, so Client's payment obligations became irrevocable once that acceptance occurred, and Client can't just unilaterally stop paying because of a defect in the goods. Section 8.2A-508(6) does give a lessee a general right to "deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any default under the lease contract from any part of the rent still due," but that right is expressly "[s]ubject to the provisions of § 8.2A-407," so it doesn't apply here. The Lease's own payment clause, which says that Client's obligations are "absolute and unconditional, irrespective of any defense or any right of setoff, counterclaim, or recoupment," reinforces the statutory result. Client also can't revoke acceptance, because § 8.2A-517(1)(a) allows revocation where a nonconformity wasn't "seasonably cured" only "[e]xcept in the case of a finance lease," and subsection (2) allows it when "the lessor defaults under the lease contract and the default substantially impairs the value" of the goods only "[e]xcept in the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease." Section 8.2A-517(1)(b) does preserve a revocation path where acceptance was induced by the lessor's assurances, but the facts don't show any assurances by Lessor, and the Lease's direction to take equipment claims to Manufacturer is the opposite of an assurance about the Trailers' condition.

On whether Lessor is responsible for the defects, § 8.2A-212(1) provides that the implied warranty of merchantability applies "[e]xcept in a finance lease," and § 8.2A-213 says the same for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, so neither warranty runs from Lessor to Client. The Lease also doesn't include any warranties from Lessor, so Client's only warranty recourse is through the supply contract. Section 8.2A-209(1) provides that "the benefit of a supplier's promises to the lessor . . . and of all warranties, whether express or implied, under the supply contract, extends to the lessee to the extent of the lessee's leasehold interest under a finance lease related to the supply contract." In a finance lease, the lessee gets the supplier's warranties rather than the lessor's, and the lessor isn't on the hook for equipment defects. Here, Manufacturer's two-year warranty on all mechanical and refrigeration components is the warranty that § 8.2A-209 extends to Client, and Client would ordinarily enforce it directly against Manufacturer. However, because Manufacturer filed for Chapter 7 and the trustee confirmed that Manufacturer won't honor outstanding warranty claims, Client's warranty recourse is limited to whatever Client can recover as an unsecured creditor in Manufacturer's Chapter 7, and Client would file a proof of claim and share in whatever the bankruptcy estate distributes on general unsecured claims.

Given all of this, Client would owe Lessor $2,200 per month per trailer for the remaining lease term even with both compressor units out of service, because the finance lease structure forecloses every avenue Client might otherwise have: § 8.2A-407(1) makes the payment obligation irrevocable, § 8.2A-508(6) is subordinate to § 8.2A-407 so there's no setoff right, § 8.2A-517(1)(a) carves out finance leases from the seasonable-cure revocation remedy, § 8.2A-517(2) carves out finance leases that are not consumer leases from the lessor-default revocation remedy, and § 8.2A-517(1)(b)'s surviving assurances path doesn't help because Lessor gave no assurances about the Trailers' condition. Client's only recovery path for the compressor defects is against Manufacturer based on the warranty benefits extended to Client by § 8.2A-209(1) and, because Manufacturer is in Chapter 7, Client would pursue that path through a proof of claim and recover only whatever the bankruptcy estate distributes on general unsecured claims.

Rubric items

Each item is evaluated as pass or fail. Weights determine partial credit; every item must pass for all-pass.

1. Concludes that Client cannot stop paying Lessor under the Lease. Weight: 3
2. Concludes that Lessor is not responsible for the defective Trailers. Weight: 3
3. States that the Lease satisfies the following requirement for a finance lease: Lessor did not select, manufacture, or supply the Trailers. Weight: 1
4. States that the Lease satisfies the following requirement for a finance lease: Lessor acquired the Trailers in connection with the Lease. Weight: 1
5. States that the Lease satisfies the following requirement for a finance lease: Client received Lessor's purchase agreement with Manufacturer before signing the Lease. Weight: 1
6. States that Client's corporate freight-hauling lease for the Trailers is not a consumer lease. Weight: 2
7. States that Client's payment obligations became irrevocable upon Client's acceptance of the Trailers. Weight: 2
8. States that Client cannot deduct the compressor damages from rent. Weight: 2
9. States that Client cannot revoke acceptance of the Trailers on either of the following grounds: (a) failure to seasonably cure the compressor defects; or (b) Lessor's default under the Lease. Weight: 2
10. States that Lessor made no assurances about the Trailers' condition that would support Client's revocation of acceptance. Weight: 2
11. States that neither the implied warranty of merchantability nor the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose runs from Lessor to Client in a finance lease. Weight: 2
12. States that Manufacturer's two-year warranty on mechanical and refrigeration components extends to Client through Lessor's purchase agreement with Manufacturer. Weight: 2
13. States that Client's warranty recourse against Manufacturer is limited to whatever Client can recover as an unsecured creditor in Manufacturer's Chapter 7. Weight: 2
14. Identifies Va. Code § 8.2A-103(1)(g) as the provision defining a finance lease. Weight: 1